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Abstract: There are relatively few Federal environmental regulations that influence agricultural 
production in the United States.  However, many local and state environmental rules may 
influence the management practices on U.S. farms, which might affect costs of production and 
adoption of best management practices. Detailed analysis of corn farms yields insight into these 
relationships and suggests that stringent environmental regulations could increase the likelihood 
of adoption of certain conservation practices, all else equal, but not costs per unit of production.   3 
On how environmental stringency influences BMP adoption 
 
Introduction 
Agricultural production affects the environment in many ways. Some impacts are positive – 
pleasant vistas and provision of wildlife habitat.  However, many impacts are not positive – 
chemical and sediment runoff into lakes, streams, and estuaries. At the State and Federal level 
policies seek to encourage the positive impacts of crop production and to lessen its negative 
impacts.  These typically rely on voluntary conservation programs, which provide education, 
technical assistance, and incentive payments to farmers for doing “good” things, such as retiring 
environmentally sensitive lands or adopting best management practices (BMPs) on land that 
remains in production.  
Voluntary approaches can succeed when farmers’ concerns over environmental quality 
reflect those of society.  When this is not the case and production decisions are based solely on 
private benefits, then farmers could under-invest in conservation if the costs of implementing and 
managing conservation practices are higher than conservation incentive payments.   
In this paper, we examine whether evidence suggests that farmers in States with relatively 
strong environmental laws are adopting environmental-quality protecting management practices 
at higher rates than elsewhere, even when such laws are not aimed directly at crop production.   
This could be an indication that information about impaired environmental quality and the 
perceived likelihood of possible regulation in the future could spur farmers to adopt practices 
they ordinarily might not.  To the best of our knowledge, no one study analyzes the impact of a 
state’s environmental stringency on the production of crops. 
We examine these questions by first probing how the costs of producing corn are related 
to a state’s environmental stringency.  Next, we estimate the influence of environmental   4 
stringency and other variables on a farmer’s decision to adopt BMPs. We conclude with a 
discussion of the results and implications for future research. 
 
Environmental Stringency 
The influence of environmental regulations on production in manufacturing and some other 
industries has been studied by various researchers (e.g., Becker and Henderson, 1999; Suna and 
Zhang, 2001). The impacts of environmental regulations on agriculture production have also 
been analyzed. Isik (2004) assessed the relationship between environmental regulation and 
spatial structure of the U.S. dairy sector. His study concludes that counties with strict 
environmental regulations are likely to lose dairy inventories to the ones with less strict 
regulations. In addition, findings of panel analysis by Herath at al. (2005) suggest that the 
regions with less stringent environmental policies have increased their shares for hog and diary 
production in the U.S. Parallel to the pollution haven hypothesis, the study also suggests that 
state environmental regulations can indirectly or directly impact the size of the animal industry in 
the state by increasing the relative abatement costs of livestock producers.  
Similarly, Metcalfe (2000) proposed that state water quality regulatory stringency on hog 
production in the US has a negative impact on the production of small hog feeding operations. 
Additionally, Metcalfe (2002) determined that stricter environmental regulations in the US will 
have a minimum effect on the international competitiveness of hog producers in the US while 
more stringent EU regulations might harm the international competitiveness of the hog producers 
in Europe. 
However, environmental regulations might have different impacts on livestock and crop 
producing industries because, compared to the crop producers, animal feeding operations can   5 
change their production locations relatively easily. That is, in contrast to capital and labor, land is 
an immobile factor of production, so crop producers cannot move their production facilities from 
one region to the other. Thus, crop producers might face greater adaptation costs from new 
environmental regulations compared to livestock producers.   
In 1997, the Environmental Law Institute published a report that analyzed the advantages 
of, shortcomings of and differences in the enforceable state laws used for prevention of nonpoint 
source water pollution, such as pollution runoff from cropland. Such differences in state 
environmental policies have important implications for the states whose economies heavily 
depend on the environmental resources.  
Another potential source of pressure to adopt environmentally-friendly production 
practices is potential conflict with non-farm populations.  In the suburban-rural fringe that is 
expanding in many parts of the country, people are moving into closer proximity to farms.  This 
has given rise to citizen complaints about noise, odors, and other factors common to farm 
operations (see for example Clayton, 2005).  Even if there are no regulations addressing these 
issues, farmers may implement practices for reducing the potential for conflicts over 
environmental quality issues. 
 
Data 
In our analysis we use farm-level agricultural and economic data from 2001 USDA Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) collected from corn producers. Corn production for 
grain occupied approximately 76 million acres of the U.S. land base in 2001, and was 
responsible for approximately $19 billion in production, and over 75 percent of the total grain 
produced in the U.S. (USDA-ERS, 2003). Because of both the coverage and the relative intensity   6 
of production on corn acres, the environmental management practices of corn producers may 
have a significant bearing on the overall environmental performance of U.S. agriculture.    
The 2001 ARMS targets the population of farms within the 48 contiguous states, where a 
“farm operation” is defined as an establishment that sold or would normally have sold at least 
$1000 of agricultural products in a year (see USDA-ERS, 2006a). Surveyed farms have unequal 
probabilities of being selected for ARMS, and multiple sampling frames, using stratification and 
clustering procedures, are used to gather sufficient sample sizes to achieve reliability of the 
estimates.  Full consideration of the sample design of ARMS is given to the estimates included 
herein.  The 2001 ARMS gathered detailed data on production practices for corn, including the 
use of management practices and detailed costs and returns of the corn operation in isolation 
from the rest of the farm.  Our survey of producers that planted corn with the intention of 
harvesting it for grain includes 1,543 observations.  These observations are weighted in such a 
way that they expand to represent 94 percent of all acres planted to corn for grain (full coverage 
is not possible because detailed corn data was drawn from the 19 highest producing states, rather 
than the entire contiguous U.S.). 
We used the ARMS data to estimate cost per bushel for each farm, following the 
recommendations of the American Agricultural Economic Association Task Force on 
Commodity Costs and Returns.  Costs include operating costs and allocated overhead of corn 
production.  Operating costs include seed, fertilizer, chemicals, custom operations, fuel, 
lubricants, electricity, repairs, and interest on operating capital.  Fixed costs include hired and 
unpaid labor (imputed using off-farm wage rates based on location and operator characteristics), 
depreciation and interest for farm machinery, land (imputed using area cash rents,) taxes and   7 
insurance, and general farm overhead.  Fixed costs were allocated to the corn operation based on 
share of corn within total farm value of production.   
To capture the potential impact of economies of scale on the unit cost of production 
(costbu measured by $/bu), we use total farm value of production (valprod measured by 
$100,000’s of sales) as a proxy to farm size. Larger farms may be more likely to invest in new 
practices, due to internal economies of size (Robinson and Napier, 2002).  We consider how the 
share of crop and animal production in total state GDP (agshare measured by %) might capture 
external factors (external economies of scale) that impact the unit cost of production. Higher 
agshare is expected to decrease unit cost of production because of its positive impact on 
production (specialization, higher concentration of agriculture in the state, external economies 
impact).  
We account for climate and soil conditions optimal for corn production using a dummy 
variable for farms located in the Heartland (heart), where more than half of corn farms are 
located and more than 70% of corn is produced (Foreman, 2001). The Heartland encompasses all 
of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and nearby the corn-producing counties in Arkansas, Ohio, Minnesota, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, and South Dakota (USDA-ERS, 2006b). Fields located on highly erodible 
land (hel) all else equal are expected to have both higher costs of production (higher runoff 
potential) and higher rates of BMP adoption (Claassen et al., 2004). Other geographically 
determined farm production and conservation practices that may affect the unit cost of corn 
production and conservation practice adoption include the use of irrigation (irrigate) and field 
drainage (drain). Irrigated farms have been found to be more likely to adopt nutrient-
management related practices (Lambert et al., 2006).   8 
In addition, we expect that farms located in counties with increased interaction between 
agricultural land use and urban-related activities face different pressures than farms located 
elsewhere. Interactions between urban-related population and farm production activities tend to 
increase the value of farmland, influence the production practices used, and elevate the 
probability that farmland will be converted to urban-related uses. It may also increase the 
probability that state-level environmental rules would be more rigorously enforced. We use 
county "population-interaction zones for agriculture" (PIZA) to represent areas of agricultural 
land use, where urban-related activities affect the economic and social environment of 
agriculture (USDA-ERS, 2005). The discrete county-level PIZA variable takes on values from 1 
(lowest agricultural-urban interaction) to 4 (highest agricultural-urban interaction).  We create a 
new variable (pnew), which combines the PIZA and the continuous population interaction index 
(USDA-ERS, 2005) to normalize the PIZA to be continuous between 0 and 4.   
We consider several farm management variables that have also been shown to influence 
farm production costs and the adoption of conservation technologies. For example, Soule, 
Abebayehu, and Wiebe (2000) find that percentage of land owned by the farmer, or land tenure, 
(ownshare measured by %) is an important determinant in the adoption of conservation practices. 
We consider how having crop insurance (cropins) might influence costs of production and BMP 
adoption. If a farm uses manure (manure) as a fertilizer, it might be subject to greater regulatory 
scrutiny (Herath et al., 2005), thereby increasing the probability of employing a nutrient 
management plan. The farmer’s yield goal (yieldgoal) might also affect per unit costs of 
production and conservation adoption --  higher yield goals would likely result in more intensive 
farming practices, which may or may not be consistent with some of the adoption technologies 
we consider (Johansson et al., 2004). Lastly, the primary occupation of the farm owner (oper)   9 
and his/her education level (educ) have been shown to be important in explaining farm 
management and technology adoption (Ferdnandex-Cornejo, Hendricks, and Mishra, 2005).  
The data to measure regulatory stringency are limited; and several different indexes are 
used to measure it. Although different indexes use different criteria to measure the stringency, 
their main focus is to address different states’ attempts to decrease environmental pollution. In 
our study, we use the stringency index (index2000) for the year 2000, developed by Herath et al. 
(2005). This index is formed for each state according to the presence or absence of seven 
regulations, which could influence farm-level operations (anti-corporate; limits on animal 
production; local administration and enforcement of regulations; bonding; state cost share 
program; manure restrictions; set-backs).  
   While we are examining if adoption of conservation practices are influenced by state-
level environmental stringency or local-level interactions with urban populations, some BMPs 
will be adopted for other financial reasons. For example, participating in a voluntary 
conservation program and receiving cost-share payments (costshare) is likely correlated to 
adoption of conservation practices (Robinson and Napier, 2002; Lambert et al., 2006). (Note that 
our data did not specify which practices were being supported, only that the farmer received a 
cost share payment).  Or it may be that some conservation practices enhance efficiency of input 
use or improve soil productivity over time. For example, nutrient management planning has been 
found to increase returns for livestock farms (Bonham, Bosch, and Pease, 2004; VanDyke et al., 
1999).   
However, the joint adoption decision of many conservation BMPs could also be 
influenced by environmental stringency for the reasons discussed earlier. We examine the use of 
conservation tillage, or having residue cover of at least 30% at the time of planting, (residue);   10 
building grassed waterways (grass), which help filter field runoff from drainage channels; use of 
filter strips at the edge of the corn field (strip), which helps reduce runoff from farm fields; 
testing the field for nitrogen and phosphorus content (test), which enable more efficient 
applications of commercial and manure nutrients; and using a yield monitor on harvesting 
equipment (precag), which also enhances the efficiency of input use on the field.   We also 
consider how conservation planning (erosion plan – eros; manure management plan – manman; 
and commercial fertilizer plan – fert) might be affected by environmental stringency.    
 
Models 
We test two hypotheses concerning environmental stringency.  First, we expect that unit costs of 
production will be higher all else equal as a function of environmental stringency as found in the 
regulation literature (e.g., Sunding, 1996; Antle, 2000; Isik, 2004). Second, we expect that 
increasing environmental stringency and close proximity to urban areas are associated with a 
greater likelihood of BMP adoption. 
 
Costs of Production 
In the first regression, we regress unit cost of corn production on a group of variables. We used 
the following simple linear regression model to assess the factors influencing the unit cost of 
corn production:  i
J
j i i X C ε β + + = ∑ =1 0 , where  i C  is the unit cost of production for farm field i 
divided by bushels harvested; X is the vector independent variables (agshare, valprod, heart, 
drain, hel, yieldgoal, educ, oper, irrigate, cropins, ownshare, manure, costshare, index2000, and 
pnew; see table 1); β  is the vector of parameter estimates; and  i ε  is the random error term. We   11 
estimate this equation using OLS using robust standard errors (White, 1980) to correct for 
potential heteroskedascity.   
 
Technology Adoption 
Our next regression examines a set of interrelated conservation practices, where it is likely that 
the decision to adopt one practice is correlated to other conservation management decisions. 
Here we consider residue management, yield monitoring, use of grassed waterways, 
development of an erosion plan, development of a manure management plan, development of a 
commercial fertilizer plan, nutrient soil testing, and the use of filter strips (see table 1). Corn 
farms show a range of adoption rates – ranging from 34% of farms employing conservation 
tillage to 7% of corn farms with filter strips on the edge of the corn field. In such a setting it is 
appropriate to use a multivariate approach to the probit estimation of adoption (Cooper, 2001). 
For our model, we estimated the following model for each farmer i using conservation practice 
j: ij ij ij X y ε β + ′ =
* , where  1 = ij y if  0
* > ij y  and  0 = ij y otherwise. Here X is the same matrix of 
dependent variables used to examine unit costs of production (i.e., agshare, valprod, heart, 
drain, hel, yieldgoal, educ, oper, irrigate, cropins, ownshare, manure, costshare, index2000, and 
pnew).  ij ε  denotes the error terms with multivariate normal distribution where each has a mean 
of zero and variance of 1. Variance-covariance matrix of error terms includes rho-correlations 
ji ij ρ ρ =  off the diagonal. We have eight equations where LHS (y*) represents the likelihood 
of adopting different, possibly interrelated, conservation practices.  
The simulated maximum likelihood technique (SML) is used to estimate our model. As 
Greene (2002) emphasized, MSL estimation has been used by a growing number of studies (e.g., 
Cooper, 2001; Belderbos et al., 2004). Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), our multivariate   12 
probit models are estimated using Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator. Eight 
dimensional normal probability distribution functions are simulated to evaluate multivariate 
probit likelihood functions.                                   
 
Results 
Our first hypothesis was that environmental stringency or contact with non-farming populations 
increases the unit cost of production.  This was not borne out by the results (table 3).  The 
estimated affect of environmental stringency on costs does not have the expected sign, although 
the statistical significance is weak. A negative coefficient indicates that all else equal, farms 
located in states with higher environmental stringency are likely to have lower costs of 
production.  This could indicate that there are unaccounted differences in the costs of production 
in regions outside of the Heartland, which are being picked up by the stringency variable; i.e., 
corn farms not in the Heartland with lower costs of production might be located in states having 
higher environmental stringency like Wisconsin. Or, it might indicate that environmental 
stringency encourages the adoption of best management practices, which could lower costs 
relative to harvests.  The variable capturing the interaction between agricultural production and 
urban population centers (pnew) does have the expected sign (positive), but it is not significant in 
the unit cost regression. 
Most coefficients for the other variables have the expected sign.  The cost per bushel of 
corn production is lower in states with a higher share of crop and animal production in total state 
GDP (agshare), indicating the existence of external economies to scale.  The costs of corn 
production per bushel were slightly lower for farms with higher total value of farm production 
(as a proxy to farm size). The negative coefficient implies increasing internal economies of scale;   13 
i.e., farms with a larger value of production have higher unit costs of production for corn.  
Farmers reporting higher yield goals are likely to have lower costs relative to harvests. Farms 
that use irrigation have higher per unit costs. Full-time farm operators (oper) have lower unit 
costs of corn production. As was found in Aigner, Hopkins, and Johansson (2003) owning a 
larger share of cropped land (ownshare) is found to decrease costs of production.  
The second hypothesis was that increasing environmental stringency or contact with the 
non-farming population is associated with a greater likelihood of BMP adoption.  The results 
found that the adoption of two practices, grassed waterways and an erosion plan were influenced 
by environmental stringency (table 4).  Grassed waterways are an effective practice for filtering 
sediment and chemicals for field runoff, thus protecting water resources.  It is generally not a 
practice that increases productivity, so its use constitutes a pure cost to the farmer. 
Adoption of an erosion plan could be for protecting soil productivity, a private benefit.  
However, an erosion plan also addresses offsite impacts of erosion, and is often implemented in 
conjunction with other practices, such as nutrient management.  Table 5 indicates that there is 
significant correlation between an erosion plan (eros) and all other types of conservation 
practices included in the analysis, indicating that an erosion plan is complementary to the other 
practices.  Our results could be an indication that environmental stringency is influencing the 
adoption of practices that address particular problems.  However, since problems vary across 
states, only the erosion plan, which is often implemented in conjunction with other practices, is 
significant in the multivariate probit model.   
Proximity to urban areas did not have the expected influence on practice adoption.  The 
only equation in which it was significant was adoption of grassed waterways, but with the wrong 
sign.  One possible explanation could be that if farmers in these areas expect to sell their land for   14 
development in the relatively near term, they might be reluctant to investment in conservation 
practices. 
Estimation results from the multivariate probit model suggest that share of agricultural 
production in total GDP of a state tends (agshare) to increase the probability of adoption of 
conservation tillage, nutrient soil testing, and yield monitoring. Farms with higher total value 
sales (valprod) show an increased use of manure management plans, perhaps capturing the 
impact of increasing manage management requirements for large livestock operations (Metcalf, 
2000). Having a field classified as highly erodible (hel) increases the probability of the farm 
using conservation tillage, managing grass waterways, and development of an erosion plan. 
These practices could be required under the Conservation Compliance provisions of  the 1985 
Food Security Act as a condition for receiving program benefits.  Setting higher yield goals 
(yieldgoal) is likely to increase the use of all conservation management practices except for filter 
strips.  
A farmer that has attended college (educ) is more likely to use yield monitors when 
harvesting his/her crop, but is no more or less likely to employ the other conservation practices 
that we examined. Full-time farmers (oper) are more likely to have nutrient management plans 
(manman and fert).  
Irrigated farms (irrigate) are more likely to be tested for soil nutrient content, but less 
likely to have erosion plans. Farms with tile drainage are also likely to be tested for soil nutrient 
content and to use filter strips. Farms using manure nutrients as fertilizer (manure) are more 
likely to have a manure management plan, but less likely to use a yield monitor while harvesting. 
While most farms report having some type of crop insurance (71 percent), those that do not are 
more likely to use grassed waterways, but less likely to use yield monitors. Farmers with more   15 
tenure (ownshare) are more likely to develop erosion plans.  This suggests that those farmers that 
rent a relatively high proportion of their operation might be a group to target for adoption of this 
BMP, which is highly correlated to other conservation practices. 
Looking at explicit carrots (receipt of conservation incentive payments) and possible 
sticks (close interaction with urban populations and state-level environmental stringency), we 
find that receiving cost-share payments (costshare) positively affects the probability of using 
nutrient testing, managing grassed waterways, developing erosion plans, and use of filter strips.  
In addition, those farms located in states with a higher environmental stringency, all else equal, 
are more likely to have grassed waterways and erosion plans.  However, having a closer 
interaction with urban populations is found to have relatively little influence over the adoption of 
BMPs, with the exception of grassed waterway. 
 
Conclusions 
In our analysis we did find evidence that environmental stringency might be influencing the 
adoption of conservation practices.  While environmental stringency could accelerate the 
adoption of environmental-quality protecting practices, we cannot say whether it provides 
enough of an incentive for policies based on voluntary adoption to adequately protect water 
quality.   
In our study, we did not analyze the change in the structure of these industries. Instead, 
assuming no change in the production locations and using cross-sectional farm data, we tested 
the hypothesis that state and local environmental stringency as measured by an index (Herath et 
al., 2001) had a positive impact on the unit costs of corn production in 2001 and on the adoption 
of conservation technologies. The regression results do not support our hypothesis about costs --   16 
increasing stringency does show a weak association with lower unit costs of production.  This 
may be explained partially by the adoption of conservation technologies, which may in fact 
lower costs relative to yield, thereby improving the farm’s bottom line.  Increasing stringency is 
shown to be positively related to the adoption of two conservation technologies – grassed 
waterways and the development of farm erosion plans. Related to this question is the result that 
many conservation technologies are treated by producers as a bundle of management decisions, 
which are not independent of each other. Developing an erosion plan is positively related to both 
environmental stringency and the adoption of all other conservation practices examined. 
One logical next step in this research would be to assess these relationships over time.  It 
is likely that there is an endogenous relationship between stringency and past adoption practices, 
difficult to discern using cross-sectional data. Similarly, tracing the impact of these conservation 
practices by reductions in soil and chemical runoff would enrich the conclusions we might draw 
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Table 1. Conservation Management Practices 
Variable Variable Name Mean Units
Grassed waterways grass 0.27 0 or 1
Filter strips strip 0.07 0 or 1
Conservation tillage residue 0.34 0 or 1
Soil nutrient testing test 0.30 0 or 1
Yield monitors precag 0.16 0 or 1
Manure nutrient plan manman 0.04 0 or 1
Commercial fertilizer plan fert 0.09 0 or 1
Erosion plan eros 0.25 0 or 1
 
Table2. Sample Means 
Variable Variable Name Mean Units
Observations 1,543.00
Households 309,455.00
Stringency index2000 3.69 index
Continuous PIZA pnew 0.85 index
Farm Size aplfarm 223.76 acres
Field Size aplfield 42.12 acres
Total Production Value valprod 1.94 $100,000's
Highly erodible field hel 0.19 0 or 1
Cost share received costshare 0.03 0 or 1
Crop insurance cropins 0.62 0 or 1
Use of manure manure 0.20 0 or 1
Field drainage drain 0.38 0 or 1
Yield goal yieldgoal 140.94 bu's
Yield goal yield 128.57 bu's
Tenure ownshare 0.53 %
Irrigation irrigate 0.09 0 or 1
Unit cost of production costbu 3.37 $/bu
Agricultural share of state GDP agshare 0.02 %
Heartland heart 0.58 0 or 1
Full-time operator oper 0.76 0 or 1
Attended college educ 0.15 0 or 1
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Table 4. Multivariate probit results*  
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
agshare 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.51 0.03 0.50
costshare 0.44 0.16 0.47 0.09 0.54 0.07 0.80 0.03
valprod 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.30 -0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.62
heart -0.08 0.47 0.01 0.92 0.28 0.02 0.10 0.42
drain -0.03 0.80 0.38 0.00 0.07 0.57 -0.13 0.33
hel 0.49 0.00 -0.14 0.27 0.66 0.00 1.47 0.00
yieldgoal 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00
educ 0.09 0.51 0.20 0.11 -0.03 0.85 0.18 0.21
oper -0.25 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.47
irrigate -0.15 0.55 0.92 0.00 -0.21 0.67 -0.89 0.00
cropins 0.12 0.39 0.02 0.92 -0.34 0.06 -0.06 0.69
ownshare -0.09 0.47 0.07 0.61 -0.09 0.61 0.39 0.00
manure -0.22 0.10 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.94
index2000 -0.02 0.73 -0.01 0.89 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.00
pnew 0.02 0.72 -0.05 0.47 -0.18 0.02 0.07 0.34
_cons -1.06 0.00 -1.85 0.00 -1.86 0.00 -3.36 0.00
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
agshare 0.05 0.47 0.01 0.90 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.31
costshare 0.37 0.32 0.43 0.22 -0.58 0.21 1.38 0.00
valprod 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.54
heart 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.03 0.14 0.29 0.08 0.64
drain -0.09 0.66 0.08 0.63 0.14 0.27 0.48 0.01
hel 0.08 0.73 0.05 0.74 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.56
yieldgoal 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.62
educ 0.16 0.44 -0.21 0.24 0.38 0.01 0.23 0.20
oper 0.90 0.00 0.45 0.04 0.24 0.12 0.20 0.28
irrigate -0.36 0.21 -0.12 0.58 -0.17 0.43 -0.39 0.21
cropins 0.03 0.84 -0.09 0.61 0.37 0.01 -0.06 0.78
ownshare 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.20 -0.14 0.31 -0.12 0.53
manure 1.03 0.00 0.06 0.72 -0.37 0.03 -0.01 0.95
index2000 0.02 0.78 0.06 0.31 -0.04 0.34 -0.05 0.40
pnew 0.09 0.40 -0.08 0.38 -0.04 0.59 0.00 0.97








* Log-likelihood = -931,593.04; a chi-square test with 120 degrees of freedom rejects the null (that there is effect of 
the independent variables on the probability of BMP adoptions) at the 0.0000 level.   24 
Table 5. Rho-correlation matrix for conservation practices 
Practice residue test grass eros manman fert precag strip
residue 1.00
test 0.04 1.00




















0.16 0.04 0.05 1.00
 
a/ indicates significance at the 5% level; b/ indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 